The Origination Clause, Article 1 §7.1

On Wednesdays we study the Constitution.

Why study? Well, I think it should be obvious that democracy dies when citizens are dumb. I don’t want to be dumb, and I don’t want democracy to die.

Why Wednesday? It works with my schedule.

What’s next? Article One, Section 7, Clause 1, aka the Origination Clause.

Article 1 of the Constitution is all about the legislature. Section 6 was a curious little section framed as limitations on what electeds can do, but really designed to protect them from undue influence from the executive branch. Section 7, Clause 1 actually gets its own name. It’s called the Origination Clause. It even has a nickname, the Revenue Clause.

Article 1 §7.1

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

What a strange rule to make. I guess that since any revenue the federal government raises is likely to be tapped from the veins of the proletariat, it makes sense that the more populist House should be the one allowed to generate new income schemes. But if that’s the case, why can the Senate tack money-making schemes onto other bills using amendments?

And now that I think about it, so far there has not been anything said about sucking the common man dry, so it’s just an assumption at this point. It’s a common philosophy that the role of government is “anything necessary but not profitable,” but so far that doesn’t come from the Constitution. I wonder if there was any discussion about barring government from going into business? I guess I’ll find out when I get around to reading the Federalist papers.

Well, when in doubt, it’s a safe bet that a clause is about separating and balancing the powers of government (really, these guys had one idea), and according to the Annotated Constitution (p 148), that’s the case here as well. But in this case, it’s a little wiggly.

It applies, in the context of the permissibility of Senate amendments to a House-passed bill, to all bills for collecting revenue—revenue decreasing as well as revenue increasing—rather than simply to just those bills that increase revenue. Only bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the word are comprehended by the phrase “all bills for raising revenue”; bills for other purposes, which incidentally create revenue, are not included.

Apparently, revenue for specific government programs is not the same as revenue to support government in general, either (I’m getting split ends from these exceptions).

Examples of exceptions include:

• A Senate-initiated bill for a monetary “special assessment” to pay into a crime victims fund,
• A tax on the circulating notes of national banks could be used to pay for enactment of an act providing a national currency secured by U.S. bonds,
• A tax in the District of Columbia to pay railroad companies for construction of a railway station,
• Substiting a corporation tax for an inheritance tax,
• And adding an excise tax on foreign-built pleasure yachts.

If I had a clearer understanding of why the House is the originating body, I think I’d be angered by the willy-nilly addition of fund-raising amendments by the Senate. Sigh. I guess that means I’ve got to do a little digging. Fortunately, Wikipedia has a pretty nice summary of the background. As usual, the clause is rooted in British practice, and makes up part of the “Great Compromise” that sort of split the difference between approaches that would disproportionately empower large states or small states. I quote:

This practice was intended to ensure that the power of the purse is possessed by the legislative body most responsive to the people, although the British practice was modified in America by allowing the Senate to amend these bills.

This clause was part of the Great Compromise between small and large states. The large states were unhappy with the lopsided power of small states in the Senate, and so the Origination Clause theoretically offsets the unrepresentative nature of the Senate, compensating the large states for allowing equal voting rights to Senators from small states.

Oh, okay then. It’s one of those clumsy, inelegant solutions that frustrate rationalists and mark functional political processes, where people give a little to get a little so that no one is completely happy, but at least we’ve got an agreement so now we can move on and get some work done.

And basically, it seems to have worked. There are lots of test cases where various Senate amendments have been challenged and mostly stood, but the basic agreement, inelegant and sort of nonsensical as it is, has stood the test of time and allowed Congress to get things done.